The biggest thing that needs to be changed is that " weather is no longer normal". ie it will always have four seasons etc. AS variability is the key and only way to survive is adapt. So personally I feel that, first before providing extension the scientific community needs to understand the dynamics of weather, as then only can the same be expected from the farmers.In my experience, farmers are more adept in handling climate change then the Scientific community. So as they say the change in perception has to start at home.
We have tested AgriHit Plant Tonic, also marketed as AgriHit Plant Growth & Heath Enhancer http://www.agrihit.com. It is natural plant based concentrated product that works wonders. Simply dilute it with water and spray plants every 14 days to keep them healthy. In subsequent trials that we have conducted on cucumbers, tomatoes, rice etc. we had no negative result to beneficial living things, it prevented illness, provided great control on insects. Very good prevention of lepidopterous insects. We were able to reduce downy mildew 90.3%, blight 89.97%, anthracnose 81.5%, green house whitefly 87.54%, curcurbit leaf beetle 91.2%, America fly 63.33%, aphid and moth 90.3%, yield output increased by 9.4%. BTW, it is not insecticide, AgriHit is a technically advanced plant application product that naturally improves photosynthesis, thus increasing root mass, yield and BRIX levels (natural sweetness), but as a side effect it also affects small pest insects. AgriHit immediately impacts the exoskeleton structure of the pest upon contact by disrupting the molecular structure of the chitin and other protein substances that protect the insect. This mechanism of action triggers the rapid and irreversible deterioration of the insect’s spiracles and tracheal system, resulting in suffocation (as in the case of the adult mosquito). The major benefit of this revolutionary method of insect control is the absence of undesirable side effects on human health and the ecosystem. It will not affect bees..... just spray it early morning or late evening while bees are still in their hives, so you don't spray directly on bees while they do their job :)...
Its amazing, looking at the time and effort you put into your blog and detailed information you provide. I'll bookmark your blog and visit it weekly for your new posts.
I Will Be Coming Back Soon, Thanks for posting Some Great ideas and I'll try to return back With A Completely different browser to check out Things! Also, I put a link to your blog at my site, hope you do not mind
Drip irrigation is an irrigation method that saves water and fertilizer by allowing water to drip slowly to the roots of plants, either onto the soil surface or directly onto the root zone, through a network of valves, pipes, tubing, and emitters. It is done through narrow tubes that deliver water directly to the base of the plant.
or here http://www.lvg-germany.de/agriculture/drip-irrigation-systems.html
Hi everyone - I just wanted to post the link to the Partnership for Aflatoxin Control in Africa (PACA) website at: http://www.aflatoxinpartnership.org/
Complex question and big initiatives tend to trigger scepticism amongst many, especially when aimed at old problems. I'd like to believe that the PAC can galvanize policymakers, researchers, trade/private sector and consumers into a collective, scaled and longterm effort.... focusing on building coherence between local and export practices and standards so that these are mutually reinforcing (not necessarily the same); not segregating good and poor quality for export and non-export markets. But equally (in principle) it provides the frame by which the donor community can position themselves and ensure synergy of effort. More likely it can serve as a platform for learning and building on many disparate projects. A key challenge for PAC will be to ensure that investments made are balanced across the many areas to be addressed, from policy, to research, to education, to the private sector to government laboratories and private laboratories. Donors have a tendency to congregate, as in the kitchen at parties, and PAC can look to prevent this crowding of what is seen as fashionable.
If PAC can achieve one thing it is to address the local (non-export) market need for monitoring of afalatoxin in food and feed, and to prevent this from being that which was seen as unfit for export. PAC must therefore educate consumers and policy makers to demand better control over aflatoxin in local produce and, by doing, give incentive to a nascent private sector to move in and capture a price premium about afaltoxin control. The technology to monitor and even to mitigate for aflatoxin is pretty much in place; how to position and enforce monitoring is a steeper challenge.
Following Julian's comments, we don't distinguish between plant pests and diseases in the IPPC/CPM - international standards aim to address all pests (the IPPC definition includes pests and diseases under the one term). The example of Tuta absoluta is an important one in showing the lessons that need to be learned - it probably arrived in Europe on fruit or packaging and has then spread rapidly into N Africa.
Species, variant etc are best seen as descriptive terms that aim to say there is a difference and we need to note that difference in not thinking on them as the same. CBSV and UCBSV is a good example in that we need to understand better the functional significance we see in the RNA sequences of these viruses (that are so distinct that they have been assigned species status). Unless proven as 'substantially equivalent' these need to be considered as different in breeding schemes, in surveillance and monitoring and research on spread and loss.
For sure we need to keep on top of the diversity we see emerging within these species and where they are. And in the short-term I can only see this being achieved through bespoke surveys (as undertaken in the GLCI). But we must in the long-term recognize that that type of activity, funded by donors, can not be sustained and we need to embedded surveillance into other cost viable practices.
These might be with the private sector in seed systems, extensions services and plant clinics.
During the talk we showed our colours as plant pathologist more than entomologists, and you are absolutely right to bring emphasis to the risk of insects.
But I think the principles involved in strengthening a plant health systems are largely common in looking at insects, virus, bacteria, fungi etc events. It is the eyes of the farmers, public and private sector that will most likely see pest and disease events first and it is this awareness we need to capture in a structured way through the clinics and extension services, and articulate 'upwards' to national organizations etc.
Interesting question in context of the mindset that free trade is constrained by a need to monitor for pests and disease. A different view is that free trade is only possible when it is monitored for pests and diseases; otherwise it can come with huge costs (i.e a new disease or pest) and is thus far from 'free' to the country and farmer. Currently, through development activity farmers are receiving 'free' planting materiel without the necessary checks on pests and disease and thus we see disease of cassava, banana and maize moving at a pass that can only be attributed to seed movement.
I'm not sure if you mean that the seed is free or if there are no restrictions on the trade, but either way countries/growers need to know what they are getting, i.e where it has come from. Movement of seed and other germplasm has spread pests and diseases as well as invasive weeds. So short-term gains from getting in new seed may lead to long-term problems if pests and invasive species are introduced which lead to longer-term crop losses. But if seed is tested and shown to be free of harmful organisms these problems can be reduced. Various international standards cover this while the IPPC is currently working on a standard specifically on the international movement in seed.
Narendra, thanks first of all for participating in the webinar. I am not personally qualified to give you advice but as per the presentation message, you can get some answers from the open access Plantwise web site. Go to http://www.plantwise.org/KnowledgeBank/CountryHome.aspx and select India(?) as your home country. Then in the bottom left box < Identify a pest problem >, select < Rice > from the drop down menu, and < whole plant > (for example) from the 2nd menu. You will see on the next screen 179 listed pests and diseases, affecting rice exclusively and/or also affecting other crops. Your search results will take you to information sheets and treatment recommendations where we have them.
In certain Indian States (e.g. UP) CABI is running some atypical crop-specific (rice) clinics which may have more relevant local information for you. Feel free to send an email to my colleague Kavya Dashora ([email protected]) who may be able to refer you to more specific info.
As I do not know if our exchanges are restricted to ourselves or opened to everybody on this website, I continue in English.
In fact I would recommend you to read my recent book "Réguler les prix agricoles" at L'Harmattan where the last chapter is devoted to detailed arguments for reauthorizing the use of variable levies.
I am not sure to have a complete answer but here are some elements:
1) By showing that academic results (based on modelling) supporting the doctrine rely on hypotheses that are far from being satisfied in DCs and that the consequences of them not being satisfied are very important in terms of food security and long-run development. It is exactly what I tried to do in my article forthcoming in Global Food Security (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211912413000035). It is important because academic models have influenced a lot international organizations and, as a result, donors who play a very important role in DC policy making (due to the lack of means of DC governments)
2) By documenting past experiences (both success stories and failures) in order to:
i) show the strong correlation between successful green revolutions and floor price policies, as illustrated by the numerous works by Peter Timmer and a recent paper by Demeke et al. (http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap536e/ap536e.pdf)
ii) put in evidence the condition of success of price stabilization policies (means, governance, complementary policies...)
Well in fact, WTO rules are restricting the use of different tools necessary to hold prices above a floor: import taxes, export subsidies and purchase by public stocks at a price higher than the market price. Note that they are not restricting the symmetric tools (import subsidies, export restrictions and subsidized sales by public stocks - necessary to hold the price below a ceiling), the reason for this being that WTO rules for agricultural commodities have been elaborated in a period of agricultural surpluses and their aim is to guarantee the competition between suppliers. Although in periods of scarcity, the competition between users (and uses) becomes crucial, as we have seen since 2008.
For developing countries aiming to guarantee floor prices, the most important tools are import taxes and purchase of public buffer stocks.
The level of import taxes is restricted by the WTO but also their variability. Regarding the level, the import tax rate is bounded and countries are only allowed to go beyond this rate by using the special safeguard clause (SSG), whose use is restricted to some countries and some conditions. Regarding the variability, the case Argentina versus Chile clarified that import taxes indexed on the international price are prohibited by the WTO. The probability of these rules to be revised is quite low (India's proposal to expand the condition of use of the SSG and US opposition to this proposal has been one of the main cause of the failure of the July 2008 WTO negotiations). Some countries are advocating for a new mechanism : the special safeguard mechanism (SSM) to replace the SSG. Wait and see...
Regarding buffer stocks, WTO rules specify that if a public stock purchases at a higher price than market price, this is comptabilized in the internal support measures (amber box), which are bounded -often at low level for many DCs-. In addition, this support is calculated by using an unfair method as:
i) the reference price is not the current market price but the average price of the years 1986 to 1988 (when prices were much lower than now) (see Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 3, article 9).
ii) the quantity used is not the quantity actually purchased by the public stock but the quantity "eligible" (meaning all national production!, see (Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 3, article 8).
Again, there is a proposal (of the G33) to modify WTO rules regarding the purchase of public stocks. This proposal will be discussed in Bali in next December but it is likely to face a strong opposition (especially from the USA).
On the demand side, it is often difficult for DC farmers, traders and processors to use these tools because i) they are not aware of their existence ii) they don’t know how to use them iii) they find these tools too expensive iv) the quantities they buy or sold are too low to make it profitable to use these tools. Points i) to iii) can be solved by supporting the use of risk hedging tools (information, training, subsidies) as has been done by the World Bank and other donors. Point iv) is much more challenging to solve: it means that these tools are only relevant for big actors, leaving small-scale and medium-scale farmers without any cover against price risk. But the major constraints are often coming from the supply side.
On the supply side, it is very difficult to offer price-risk hedging tools. That is the reason why very few futures markets for grains do exist. They are missing for some of them (millet and sorghum) and not working for others (the rice futures contract launched in Thailand often has no quotes due to the lack of transactions). And when they function well (as is the case for wheat and maize), they are located far from DC (in USA, Western Europe…), what undermine a lot the cover they provide for DC market actors (due to transport costs and differences in quality, the price faced by DC farmers is very few correlated with the price of the future market (which is the price whose risk is covered by options and other price-risk hedging tools). See the graph with the price of maize in Mali and on the South African SAFEX in my Powerpoint (slide 35). A potential solution would be building futures markets in developing countries but it is not a very realistic option: building futures markets previously requires to have commodity exchange (with spot contracts) attracting enough volumes. And the African experience showed that developing such commodity exchange for grain is very challenging: existing African commodity exchange mainly trade exported cash crops such as coffee, the volume of grain traded are extremely small and in a great part due to te purchases of the World Food program, see box 4 in my book pp. 132-135 http://www.afd.fr/webdav/site/afd/shared/PUBLICATIONS/RECHERCHE/Scientif...
Well, there is a very strong difference between B and C regarding the cost - cover balance. For C (public stabilisation policies), the cover is the same for everyone because all farmers are facing almost the same floor price (not exactly the same because of differences in transport costs - the floor price is fixed for a specific place of delivery). For B (risk hedging tools), it is possible to offer different levels of cover (at different costs), for instance by offering different put options with a different exercise price. This allows farmers more exposed to risk or more risk-averse to buy a stronger cover (at a higher cost). This flexibility is one of the reasons why B-instruments are so fascinating for academics.
However, the point is to know if in practice B-instruments are able to provide a real cover to farmers and other market actors. And in developing countries it is often not the case for staple products because - as I explained in the presentation - i) no working futures markets exists for many of them (millet, sorghum, cassava, rice...) or ii) the price faced by DC farmers is very few correlated with the price of the future market (which is the price whose risk is covered by options and other price-risk hedging tools). See the graph with the price of maize in Mali and on the SAFEX in my Powerpoint (slide 35). So, in practice, B is not workable in DCs (except maybe in countries located very close to futures markets - and even in this case, B-instruments are out of reach for smallholder and medium scale farmers). C is therefore the only workable solution to provide cover to DC farmers.
I agree that the price stabilization scheme will be sustainable only if the floor price is not fixed at a too high level.
A paper by Jeroen Warner and myself on how (food) supply chain risks are commonly perceived and tackled and how this calls for more co-ordination is available at the International Risk Governance Council, www.ircg.org.
Thanks for the interesting blog - I particularly agree with your point that contracting and Warehouse Receipt Systems should be developed as a way to manage price risk as well as address liquidity restraints
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The biggest thing that needs to be changed is that " weather is no longer normal". ie it will always have four seasons etc. AS variability is the key and only way to survive is adapt. So personally I feel that, first before providing extension the scientific community needs to understand the dynamics of weather, as then only can the same be expected from the farmers.In my experience, farmers are more adept in handling climate change then the Scientific community. So as they say the change in perception has to start at home.
We have tested AgriHit Plant Tonic, also marketed as AgriHit Plant Growth & Heath Enhancer http://www.agrihit.com. It is natural plant based concentrated product that works wonders. Simply dilute it with water and spray plants every 14 days to keep them healthy. In subsequent trials that we have conducted on cucumbers, tomatoes, rice etc. we had no negative result to beneficial living things, it prevented illness, provided great control on insects. Very good prevention of lepidopterous insects. We were able to reduce downy mildew 90.3%, blight 89.97%, anthracnose 81.5%, green house whitefly 87.54%, curcurbit leaf beetle 91.2%, America fly 63.33%, aphid and moth 90.3%, yield output increased by 9.4%. BTW, it is not insecticide, AgriHit is a technically advanced plant application product that naturally improves photosynthesis, thus increasing root mass, yield and BRIX levels (natural sweetness), but as a side effect it also affects small pest insects. AgriHit immediately impacts the exoskeleton structure of the pest upon contact by disrupting the molecular structure of the chitin and other protein substances that protect the insect. This mechanism of action triggers the rapid and irreversible deterioration of the insect’s spiracles and tracheal system, resulting in suffocation (as in the case of the adult mosquito). The major benefit of this revolutionary method of insect control is the absence of undesirable side effects on human health and the ecosystem. It will not affect bees..... just spray it early morning or late evening while bees are still in their hives, so you don't spray directly on bees while they do their job :)...
Please do visit back and please feel free to add your own content or write a blog post for us sharing your work! Thank you!
it was suggested by my friend and I found it really useful and beneficial. I like to see more information like this
pest controls companies
Its amazing, looking at the time and effort you put into your blog and detailed information you provide. I'll bookmark your blog and visit it weekly for your new posts.
I Will Be Coming Back Soon, Thanks for posting Some Great ideas and I'll try to return back With A Completely different browser to check out Things! Also, I put a link to your blog at my site, hope you do not mind
DRIP IRRIGATION SYSTEM
Drip irrigation is an irrigation method that saves water and fertilizer by allowing water to drip slowly to the roots of plants, either onto the soil surface or directly onto the root zone, through a network of valves, pipes, tubing, and emitters. It is done through narrow tubes that deliver water directly to the base of the plant.
or here http://www.lvg-germany.de/agriculture/drip-irrigation-systems.html
It's rising.
Hi everyone - I just wanted to post the link to the Partnership for Aflatoxin Control in Africa (PACA) website at: http://www.aflatoxinpartnership.org/
You can also take a look at FARMD's Featured Topic on Aflatoxin for a bit more background information and latest news headlines at: https://www.agriskmanagementforum.org/fstory/featured-topic-aflatoxin-ri...
Complex question and big initiatives tend to trigger scepticism amongst many, especially when aimed at old problems. I'd like to believe that the PAC can galvanize policymakers, researchers, trade/private sector and consumers into a collective, scaled and longterm effort.... focusing on building coherence between local and export practices and standards so that these are mutually reinforcing (not necessarily the same); not segregating good and poor quality for export and non-export markets. But equally (in principle) it provides the frame by which the donor community can position themselves and ensure synergy of effort. More likely it can serve as a platform for learning and building on many disparate projects. A key challenge for PAC will be to ensure that investments made are balanced across the many areas to be addressed, from policy, to research, to education, to the private sector to government laboratories and private laboratories. Donors have a tendency to congregate, as in the kitchen at parties, and PAC can look to prevent this crowding of what is seen as fashionable.
If PAC can achieve one thing it is to address the local (non-export) market need for monitoring of afalatoxin in food and feed, and to prevent this from being that which was seen as unfit for export. PAC must therefore educate consumers and policy makers to demand better control over aflatoxin in local produce and, by doing, give incentive to a nascent private sector to move in and capture a price premium about afaltoxin control. The technology to monitor and even to mitigate for aflatoxin is pretty much in place; how to position and enforce monitoring is a steeper challenge.
Phil,
Thank you for the link above. I look forward to seeing the post of the more recent work too.
Regards
Andrew
Following Julian's comments, we don't distinguish between plant pests and diseases in the IPPC/CPM - international standards aim to address all pests (the IPPC definition includes pests and diseases under the one term). The example of Tuta absoluta is an important one in showing the lessons that need to be learned - it probably arrived in Europe on fruit or packaging and has then spread rapidly into N Africa.
Harry Evans published a paper in Tropical Plant Pathology back in 2009 on Brazil: see http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1982-56762009000200005&script=sci_a...
Other more recent work has been done: will mail to you and post to this site ASAP
Species, variant etc are best seen as descriptive terms that aim to say there is a difference and we need to note that difference in not thinking on them as the same. CBSV and UCBSV is a good example in that we need to understand better the functional significance we see in the RNA sequences of these viruses (that are so distinct that they have been assigned species status). Unless proven as 'substantially equivalent' these need to be considered as different in breeding schemes, in surveillance and monitoring and research on spread and loss.
For sure we need to keep on top of the diversity we see emerging within these species and where they are. And in the short-term I can only see this being achieved through bespoke surveys (as undertaken in the GLCI). But we must in the long-term recognize that that type of activity, funded by donors, can not be sustained and we need to embedded surveillance into other cost viable practices.
These might be with the private sector in seed systems, extensions services and plant clinics.
During the talk we showed our colours as plant pathologist more than entomologists, and you are absolutely right to bring emphasis to the risk of insects.
But I think the principles involved in strengthening a plant health systems are largely common in looking at insects, virus, bacteria, fungi etc events. It is the eyes of the farmers, public and private sector that will most likely see pest and disease events first and it is this awareness we need to capture in a structured way through the clinics and extension services, and articulate 'upwards' to national organizations etc.
Interesting question in context of the mindset that free trade is constrained by a need to monitor for pests and disease. A different view is that free trade is only possible when it is monitored for pests and diseases; otherwise it can come with huge costs (i.e a new disease or pest) and is thus far from 'free' to the country and farmer. Currently, through development activity farmers are receiving 'free' planting materiel without the necessary checks on pests and disease and thus we see disease of cassava, banana and maize moving at a pass that can only be attributed to seed movement.
I'm not sure if you mean that the seed is free or if there are no restrictions on the trade, but either way countries/growers need to know what they are getting, i.e where it has come from. Movement of seed and other germplasm has spread pests and diseases as well as invasive weeds. So short-term gains from getting in new seed may lead to long-term problems if pests and invasive species are introduced which lead to longer-term crop losses. But if seed is tested and shown to be free of harmful organisms these problems can be reduced. Various international standards cover this while the IPPC is currently working on a standard specifically on the international movement in seed.
Narendra, thanks first of all for participating in the webinar. I am not personally qualified to give you advice but as per the presentation message, you can get some answers from the open access Plantwise web site. Go to http://www.plantwise.org/KnowledgeBank/CountryHome.aspx and select India(?) as your home country. Then in the bottom left box < Identify a pest problem >, select < Rice > from the drop down menu, and < whole plant > (for example) from the 2nd menu. You will see on the next screen 179 listed pests and diseases, affecting rice exclusively and/or also affecting other crops. Your search results will take you to information sheets and treatment recommendations where we have them.
In certain Indian States (e.g. UP) CABI is running some atypical crop-specific (rice) clinics which may have more relevant local information for you. Feel free to send an email to my colleague Kavya Dashora ([email protected]) who may be able to refer you to more specific info.
Hope this helps
Good afternoon Frank
Thanks for your answers.
As I do not know if our exchanges are restricted to ourselves or opened to everybody on this website, I continue in English.
In fact I would recommend you to read my recent book "Réguler les prix agricoles" at L'Harmattan where the last chapter is devoted to detailed arguments for reauthorizing the use of variable levies.
At the same time I recommend that you read my specific paper on the G33 proposal for a Bali formal endorsement: http://www.solidarite.asso.fr/IMG/pdf/Solidarite_supports_the_G-33_propo...
with a summary prepared for SUNS, a daly electronic letter of the Third World Network: http://www.solidarite.asso.fr/IMG/pdf/Trade_-_US_provides_larger_per_cap...
Then I look forward for your comments on these two issues.
Bonne fin de semaine
Jacques
That's a really good question!
I am not sure to have a complete answer but here are some elements:
1) By showing that academic results (based on modelling) supporting the doctrine rely on hypotheses that are far from being satisfied in DCs and that the consequences of them not being satisfied are very important in terms of food security and long-run development. It is exactly what I tried to do in my article forthcoming in Global Food Security (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211912413000035). It is important because academic models have influenced a lot international organizations and, as a result, donors who play a very important role in DC policy making (due to the lack of means of DC governments)
2) By documenting past experiences (both success stories and failures) in order to:
i) show the strong correlation between successful green revolutions and floor price policies, as illustrated by the numerous works by Peter Timmer and a recent paper by Demeke et al. (http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap536e/ap536e.pdf)
ii) put in evidence the condition of success of price stabilization policies (means, governance, complementary policies...)
Other suggestions are welcome!
Well in fact, WTO rules are restricting the use of different tools necessary to hold prices above a floor: import taxes, export subsidies and purchase by public stocks at a price higher than the market price. Note that they are not restricting the symmetric tools (import subsidies, export restrictions and subsidized sales by public stocks - necessary to hold the price below a ceiling), the reason for this being that WTO rules for agricultural commodities have been elaborated in a period of agricultural surpluses and their aim is to guarantee the competition between suppliers. Although in periods of scarcity, the competition between users (and uses) becomes crucial, as we have seen since 2008.
For developing countries aiming to guarantee floor prices, the most important tools are import taxes and purchase of public buffer stocks.
The level of import taxes is restricted by the WTO but also their variability. Regarding the level, the import tax rate is bounded and countries are only allowed to go beyond this rate by using the special safeguard clause (SSG), whose use is restricted to some countries and some conditions. Regarding the variability, the case Argentina versus Chile clarified that import taxes indexed on the international price are prohibited by the WTO. The probability of these rules to be revised is quite low (India's proposal to expand the condition of use of the SSG and US opposition to this proposal has been one of the main cause of the failure of the July 2008 WTO negotiations). Some countries are advocating for a new mechanism : the special safeguard mechanism (SSM) to replace the SSG. Wait and see...
Regarding buffer stocks, WTO rules specify that if a public stock purchases at a higher price than market price, this is comptabilized in the internal support measures (amber box), which are bounded -often at low level for many DCs-. In addition, this support is calculated by using an unfair method as:
i) the reference price is not the current market price but the average price of the years 1986 to 1988 (when prices were much lower than now) (see Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 3, article 9).
ii) the quantity used is not the quantity actually purchased by the public stock but the quantity "eligible" (meaning all national production!, see (Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 3, article 8).
Again, there is a proposal (of the G33) to modify WTO rules regarding the purchase of public stocks. This proposal will be discussed in Bali in next December but it is likely to face a strong opposition (especially from the USA).
Well there are two kinds of difficulties.
On the demand side, it is often difficult for DC farmers, traders and processors to use these tools because i) they are not aware of their existence ii) they don’t know how to use them iii) they find these tools too expensive iv) the quantities they buy or sold are too low to make it profitable to use these tools. Points i) to iii) can be solved by supporting the use of risk hedging tools (information, training, subsidies) as has been done by the World Bank and other donors. Point iv) is much more challenging to solve: it means that these tools are only relevant for big actors, leaving small-scale and medium-scale farmers without any cover against price risk. But the major constraints are often coming from the supply side.
On the supply side, it is very difficult to offer price-risk hedging tools. That is the reason why very few futures markets for grains do exist. They are missing for some of them (millet and sorghum) and not working for others (the rice futures contract launched in Thailand often has no quotes due to the lack of transactions). And when they function well (as is the case for wheat and maize), they are located far from DC (in USA, Western Europe…), what undermine a lot the cover they provide for DC market actors (due to transport costs and differences in quality, the price faced by DC farmers is very few correlated with the price of the future market (which is the price whose risk is covered by options and other price-risk hedging tools). See the graph with the price of maize in Mali and on the South African SAFEX in my Powerpoint (slide 35). A potential solution would be building futures markets in developing countries but it is not a very realistic option: building futures markets previously requires to have commodity exchange (with spot contracts) attracting enough volumes. And the African experience showed that developing such commodity exchange for grain is very challenging: existing African commodity exchange mainly trade exported cash crops such as coffee, the volume of grain traded are extremely small and in a great part due to te purchases of the World Food program, see box 4 in my book pp. 132-135 http://www.afd.fr/webdav/site/afd/shared/PUBLICATIONS/RECHERCHE/Scientif...
Well, there is a very strong difference between B and C regarding the cost - cover balance. For C (public stabilisation policies), the cover is the same for everyone because all farmers are facing almost the same floor price (not exactly the same because of differences in transport costs - the floor price is fixed for a specific place of delivery). For B (risk hedging tools), it is possible to offer different levels of cover (at different costs), for instance by offering different put options with a different exercise price. This allows farmers more exposed to risk or more risk-averse to buy a stronger cover (at a higher cost). This flexibility is one of the reasons why B-instruments are so fascinating for academics.
However, the point is to know if in practice B-instruments are able to provide a real cover to farmers and other market actors. And in developing countries it is often not the case for staple products because - as I explained in the presentation - i) no working futures markets exists for many of them (millet, sorghum, cassava, rice...) or ii) the price faced by DC farmers is very few correlated with the price of the future market (which is the price whose risk is covered by options and other price-risk hedging tools). See the graph with the price of maize in Mali and on the SAFEX in my Powerpoint (slide 35). So, in practice, B is not workable in DCs (except maybe in countries located very close to futures markets - and even in this case, B-instruments are out of reach for smallholder and medium scale farmers). C is therefore the only workable solution to provide cover to DC farmers.
I agree that the price stabilization scheme will be sustainable only if the floor price is not fixed at a too high level.
A paper by Jeroen Warner and myself on how (food) supply chain risks are commonly perceived and tackled and how this calls for more co-ordination is available at the International Risk Governance Council, www.ircg.org.
http://www.irgc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/K.BurgerJ.Warner_food-sup...
Thanks for the interesting blog - I particularly agree with your point that contracting and Warehouse Receipt Systems should be developed as a way to manage price risk as well as address liquidity restraints